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Abstract 
Recent events in New Orleans have shown the magnitude of life loss and 
property damage that can occur due to the failure of man-made levees. The 
California Bay Delta and Sacramento levee systems in California pose a similar or 
greater level of risk to life and property. In order to effectively mitigate the hazard 
associated with levee failure a systematic evaluation of risk must be carried out. This 
paper presents preliminary research into the risk associated with the California Bay 
Delta. A comprehensive list of failure modes for man-made levees is presented. 
Preliminary empirical data on the temporal frequency of failure and the consequences 
of failure in the Bay Delta has been compiled. Also presented is the frequency of 
high water conditions, frequency of strong ground shaking, and a discussion of 
possible correlation of failure with these loading conditions. Based on preliminary 
empirical data, the distribution of the risk function is estimated using Monte Carlo 
simulations. The general objectives of this paper are to present an approach to levee 
risk analysis for the California Bay Delta, stimulate discussion, outline the data gaps 
that exist, and push for continued research on mitigating this hazard. 
Introduction 
In engineering, risk is the product of the probability of failure and the 
consequences of failure (Baecher and Christian, 2003). In order to quantify the risk 
so that performance-based decisions can be made, both the probability of failure and 
the consequences of failure must be fully characterized. Failure, as discussed in this 
paper, means any physical alteration in the levee that subsequently results in flooding. 
For this particular study the process of quantifying the risk can be lumped into two 
categories; 1) top-down, and 2) bottom-up. The top-down approach, which is 
described in this paper, is where existing data on the frequency of levee failures is 
collected and analyzed. We observe data trends, characterize the data with frequency 
or probability distributions, and attempt to interpret the results. 
The bottom-up approach is where analytical or physical testing is used to elicit 
the frequency distribution of different loading conditions and the corresponding levee 
resistances. An example of an analytical bottom-up approach is the work by Wolff 
(1996), where probabilistic slope stability analysis is performed on levees and levee 
systems. We along with colleagues at UCLA are pursuing a bottom-up physical 
testing approach where derelict levees will be tested to failure using induced ground 
shaking from an eccentric mass shaker to examine the characteristics of seismic levee 
resistance and failure. 
Failure Mechanisms 
When a levee breaches, the results can be insignificant where a few acres of 
marsh land are flooded, or catastrophic as seen with some of the New Orleans levee 
failures. Loading situations that can trigger failures fall into three categories; ground 
shaking from seismic activity, high water from an increase in runoff and/or high tides, 
and static stress conditions. From these three loading situations six related failure 
mechanisms have been observed. These six failure mechanisms were based upon a 
literature review of levee failure case histories (e.g. USACE, 2006; DWR, 2006a; 
Seed et al, 2006). These failure mechanisms include; bearing, sliding, 
slumping/spreading, seepage, erosion, and overtopping. Figure 1 shows a schematic 
of the loading functions, the failure mechanisms, and how they interrelate. 
Loading 
Function: 
Failure 
M echanism : 
Ground 
Shaking 
High 
Water 
Static 
Seepage Over-
Topping 
Erosion Slump/ 
Spread 
Sliding Bearing 
Figure 1. Diagram showing the three loading functions and six failure 
mechanisms associated with levee failure. 
The failure mechanisms have the following characteristics; 
•	 A bearing failure in levees is typically deep-seated and is most likely induced 
by seismic ground shaking. Failure is commonly triggered by a seismic event 
that either causes a loss of soil strength or produces destabilizing inertial 
loading conditions. 
•	 A sliding failure may occur if the foundation soil has a weak or brittle zone
 
resulting in a preferred failure plane. Both seismic induced inertial loading
 
and high water levels can cause sliding failures.
 
•	 Slumping and spreading can be generated by two loading conditions. Cyclic 
loading from earthquakes may generate increased pore pressures and reduced 
soil strength, leading to volumetric and/or deviatoric strains in the foundation. 
The same results can also occur due to increased pore pressures from high 
water levels and increased seepage. 
•	 Seepage is one of the most common failure mechanisms in levees. Levees are 
built in fluvial depositional environments and it is common to find levees with 
an existing sandy layer beneath the foundation. The sandy layer can be a 
conduit for flow underneath the levee, resulting in critical conditions at the 
inboard (or landside) toe. This leads to erosion of the foundation during a high 
storm or a consistent weakening of the foundation over a long period of time, 
both eventually leading to failure. Biogenic agents can also lead to 
destabilizing seepage. This can include rodent holes, tree roots, or other 
biological activity that create conduits for seepage. 
•	 High velocity flows can erode material from the outboard or waterside of the 
levee, which may lead to instability and failure. Erosion can occur at once or 
over time as a function of the storm cycle and the scale of the peak storms. 
•	 The failure mechanism of overtopping occurs when high water exceeds the 
elevation of the levee crest. The water energy is then concentrated at the 
inboard toe of the levee leading to soil erosion and decreased levee stability. 
Overtopping failure can be exacerbated by decreased levee crest height due to 
land subsidence. 
Compounding these failure mechanisms, investigation of the New Orleans levee 
failures (Seed et al., 2006) found that many failures were due to design 
inconsistencies. Areas where crest heights of two adjoining levees differ or where 
there is an opening or “weak spot” in a levee are prime locations for seepage, 
overtopping, and erosion to occur. 
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Figure 2. 
Map showing the 
Bay Delta with 
elevation contours 
relative to sea level 
(after DWR, 1993). 
Figure 2 shows a map of the Bay Delta. The relative elevation with respect to 
sea level is shown as shaded contours. In the Bay Delta levee system, because of 
subsidence and loss of soil through wind erosion the majority of the land protected by 
the levees is at or below sea level. Therefore a failure via any failure mechanism 
results in flooding. 
Empirical data 
There is paucity of useable empirical data documenting levee failures within the 
Bay Delta. This paper presents the initial findings of a data search for useable failure, 
consequences, and loading information. 
Levee Failures 
For this preliminary analysis we collected data from the California Department 
of Water Resources (DWR, 2006a; DWR Public Affairs Chief Ted Thomas, personal 
communication) and the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE, 2006) to compile a 
list of the annual number of levee failures from 1900 to the present. This list 
unfortunately does not include the mechanism of the failure but does provide us with 
a temporal measure of levee failure occurrence. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the 
number of failures per year. Based on this data we observe a mean annual rate of 
levee failure of 1.5 with a sample standard deviation of 3.4. 
One discrepancy in this database is that it does not account for the variability of 
the levees in both time and space. The levees that were built around the turn of the 
last century were little more than mounds of dirt heaped upon the existing natural 
levees, whereas today we ensure that there is at least a minimal amount of 
engineering that goes into new levee design and construction. With time more levees 
have been built, resulting in a larger overall number of levees that could potentially 
fail. These two temporal issues result in contradictory effects on the number of 
observed failures. 
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Figure 3. Histogram of the frequency of Bay Delta levee failures with time, 
from 1900 to the present. 
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Spatially the depositional environment of the foundation material in the upper 
reaches of the Delta is much different than in the lower reaches of the Delta. 
Heterogeneity of foundation and levee soils vary on many different scales from Delta 
wide variations to small local variations. The current data set is lumped together and 
therefore gives us a coarse evaluation, neglecting site specific and regional 
conditions. Ultimately we would like to account for these effects in future research. 
Consequences 
Along with the frequency of failure data we also collected data on the area of 
land flooded by the failures. This data is biased in that for a specific levee (Andrus 
Island levee for example) a fixed area of land will be flooded upon each failure (29 
km2) because it is an island that is below the mean water level and will fill up 
following every breach. Nonetheless the area flooded with each failure, aggregated 
for all the levees in the Delta, provides a crude measure of the consequences per 
failure. Figure 4 shows a histogram of the area flooded per failure (note: 100 acres = 
4.05 km2). The mean or average area flooded per levee failure is 14.1 km2, with a 
sample standard deviation of 11.2 km2. This information defines the consequences 
for the levee failures. 
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Figure 4. Histogram showing the frequency of land flooded per failure for the 
failures from 1901 to the present. 
Ground Shaking 
Although the CALFED (2000) report on the seismic vulnerability of the Delta 
levees reported “historical information indicates that there has been little damage to 
Delta levees caused by earthquakes,” for completeness we have investigated the 
possibility further. A search of historical earthquakes within 100 km of the centroid 
of the Delta results in a short list of seismic events. Of those, the only viable events, 
or events strong enough to have the potential for ground shaking within the Delta are 
the 1906 San Francisco earthquake (M7.8) and the 1980 Livermore earthquake 
(M5.8). The epicenters were located approximately 94 and 32 km from the centroid 
of the Delta, respectively. 
Using the strong ground motion attenuation relationship by Sadigh et al. (1997), 
which tends to provide a reasonable median estimate with respect to other common 
Western U.S. attenuation relationships, the peak rock accelerations are estimated to 
range from 0.05 at the centroid to 0.12 at the closest levee to the epicenters. These 
values represent an estimate of the ground motion at depth at a soil/rock boundary 
corresponding to a shear wave velocity of 760 m/sec, the NEHRP B/C site class 
boundary. To propagate the motion upwards from the soil/rock boundary to the 
surface, the effects of the deep soft Delta sediments need to be taken into account. 
The CALFED (2000) seismic vulnerability sub-team used a simplified approach, 
applying a single amplification factor of 1.6 to approximate the soft soil response. If 
we use the same approach this results in an upper bound median value of 0.2 g for 
surface ground accelerations. 
Inspection of the failure histogram shows a high frequency and a clustering of 
levee failures following the years 1906 and 1980. Further investigation into existing 
records is needed to show causation and not just a loose correlation of seismic activity 
and levee failure. 
High Water 
High water levels for the Delta levee system is a difficult parameter to measure. 
The water ways and sloughs in the Delta extend over 1000 km. The water level at 
any time against a levee within the Delta is influenced by; 1) the input of three rivers 
from the north, east, and south, 2) the tidal fluctuations of the Pacific Ocean from the 
west, and 3) water engineering features that modify flow within the system (Simi and 
Ruhl, 2005). 
For a failure analysis we are generally interested in extreme events that result in 
peak loading conditions. A cursory analysis of the high water loading conditions was 
performed for this study looking at the peak stage (or peak water surface elevation). 
The Antioch Station (B9502), location shown on Figure 2, was used as the indicator 
of high water conditions throughout the Delta because; it lies near the confluence of 
the rivers, is sufficiently downstream to experience full tidal effects, has a similar 
elevation as other low lying areas in the delta, and presented the most complete 
dataset available at the time of data collection (DWR, 2006b). 
Figure 5 shows the peak annual stage for each year. As can be seen in the plot 
the Antioch Station recorded relatively high water years in 1986, 1998, and 2006. 
Generally the peak high water was observed in or around January 1 which 
corresponds to the highest expected tides, and in the months of December through 
February which corresponds to the highest rainfall runoff, although there were some 
exceptions. This winter trend may be a good indicator to use when back-analyzing 
failure case histories. If the failure did not occur in the time frame of December 
through January, then one can check stage records around the Delta to determine if it 
was a high run-off year. If not then the failure loading can be attributed to something 
other than high water. 
At this time we do not have any evidence that high water was the cause of the 
documented levee failures. We can only show crude correlation as with the seismic 
data. It can be observed that the high flows in 1986 correspond with a rash of levee 
failures in the same year; 9 reported for that year as shown on Figure 2. The high 
flows in 1998 do not have the same corresponding frequency of failures, but the peak 
annual stage in 1997 is close to the level in 1986 and we see a number of failures 
reported for 1997. If the weak levees had already failed due to the high flows in 1997 
then there may have been few left to fail with the slightly higher flows in 1998. 
Again, this interpretation is strictly correlative and further investigations into the 
failure records needs to be performed to show causation. 
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Figure 5. Plot of the peak annual stage at the Antioch Station for the years 
1983 to the present. 
Another effect that needs to be investigated is the occurrence of rapid water level 
drawdown and the potential for this to destabilize levees. Conceptually this is 
possible, but it is unknown if this has been observed and if there exists stage data with 
sufficient resolution to measure a rapid decrease in the water level. 
Risk Analysis 
Risk in an engineering context is the product of the probability of failure and the 
consequences of that failure (Baecher and Christian, 2003). The data collected so far 
provides a coarse measure of the probability of failure and the consequences of 
failure for the California Bay Delta. Although it would be more useful to have the 
consequences in terms of dollar figures or loss of life, at this stage in the research we 
have information on area of land flooded with future goals of tying this to dollar 
figures and life risk. To provide a performance-based measure of the risk we model 
the probability of failure and consequences as random variables and then perform 
Monte Carlo simulations to model the distribution of the product. 
The annual probability of failure can be modeled as a discrete random variable 
using the statistics of failure frequency as described previously. We assume that each 
levee failure represents an independent event in space and time and use the negative 
binomial distribution (Ang and Tang, 2007) to model the number of discrete levee 
failures in a given time frame. By inspection the negative binomial distribution 
provides a reasonable fit to the data, with a µ=1.2 and a σ=3.0 which compares to the 
sample mean of 1.5 and sample standard deviation of 3.4. This distribution was 
truncated at 21 failures, the maximum reported number of annual failures. 
The consequences of a levee failure can be modeled using a shifted gamma 
distribution (Ang and Tang, 2007) that approximates the limited data set. By 
inspection the shifted gamma distribution provides a reasonable fit to the data, with a 
µ=16.0 and a σ=12.6 which compares to the sample mean of 14.1 and sample 
standard deviation of 11.2. 
A Monte Carlo simulation sampled from both distributions, and the product is an 
estimate of the risk distribution. We randomly generated the annual number of levee 
failures following the negative binomial distribution, calculated the probability of this 
number of failures in any given year, and then randomly generated the flooded area 
per failure following the shifted Gamma distribution. The result is the frequency 
distribution of the annual amount of land flooded due to levee failures in the Delta. 
The number of simulations was increased until the risk distribution produced 
consistent results and the average or expected value stabilized. The following 
equation describes the process for a single simulation, 
R = p( f ) ⋅∑ci i n
 
n
 
where Ri is the ith simulation of the risk function, p(fi) is the ith probability of n 
number of randomly generated annual failures, and cn is the randomly generated 
consequences for each failure summed up for n number of annual failures. The result 
(Figure 6) is a distribution showing the annual frequency of km2 flooded. This risk 
distribution indicates that the average or expected annual amount of land flooded due 
to levee failure, irrespective of the failure mechanism, is on the order of 8.54 km2. 
The risk distribution exhibits an exponentially decreasing function indicating that 
there is a much higher frequency of little or no flooding than large catastrophic 
events. 
If economic figures were applied to this risk function then we could calculate the 
annual expected value of economic loss. This would involve coming up with the 
spatial distribution of different economic bins for land valuation (e.g. agricultural 
land versus housing subdivisions). The risk could then be used as input in a decision 
tree, representing the different economic bins and the potential for annual losses 
presented in dollar figures. This decision tree could also be expanded to account for 
the potential for life loss due to levee failure. 
Future Research 
The next step in this top-down approach of quantifying the risk of levee failure 
in the Bay Delta is to parse the risk distribution into fractions by loading function. 
First we need to acquire better documentation of the nature of failure for each of the 
reported failures, and then corroborate these failure mechanisms with the loading 
functions. Peak high water data that extends back further than 1983 would be 
particularly useful in determining the correlation with levee failures. 
After the data has been plumbed for its usefulness we can then perform 
comparative analytical modeling to determine the most likely cause of failure for a 
given levee cross-section and levee condition. Performing this for several 
representative levee cross-sections would provide us with a relative measure of 
priority in loading conditions and failure mechanisms. 
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Figure 6. Results of 106 Monte Carlo simulations for the distributions of the 
annual number of failures, land flooded per failure, and the annual 
risk. 
As the data and analyses become more refined we can represent the Bay Delta 
and associated risk in a GIS based format to account for spatial variability of loading, 
resistance, and consequences. Ultimately this is the goal, to have a map showing 
gradations of loading, resistance, relative risk of each levee reach, and the 
consequences of a specific levee failure. This would allow decision-makers to focus 
efforts on the most susceptible and potentially costly levee failures in a systematic 
manner. 
Summary 
This paper presents preliminary analysis of the risk associated with the 
California Bay Delta levee system. A conceptual framework of levee failure was 
outlined. A preliminary database was collected and processed for use in a risk-based 
format. Frequency distributions were fit to the data and then Monte Carlo simulations 
were used to sample the distributions and estimate the risk function. The results are 
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presented as the annual probability distribution of levee failure, the distribution of 
consequences or land flooded per levee failure, and the risk distribution of annual 
land flooded in the Delta. The authors hope to stimulate discussion of risk in the 
Delta, identify gaps in the existing data, and push for more research to help mitigate 
the hazard associated with levee failures in California and elsewhere. 
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